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Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court typically hire law clerks to help them
perform their duties. We study whether these clerks influence how Supreme
Court justices vote on the cases argued before them. To do so, we exploit
the timing of the clerkship hiring process to link variation in clerk ideology
to variation in judicial voting. We measure clerk ideology by matching
clerks to the universe of publicly disclosed political donations. Our results
suggest a positive and statistically significant effect of clerk ideology
on judicial voting: justices cast approximately 4% more conservative
votes in terms employing their most conservative clerks, as compared
to terms in which they employ their most liberal clerks. We find larger
effects in cases that are higher profile, cases that are legally significant,
and cases in which the justices are more evenly divided. We interpret
our results as providing suggestive evidence that clerk influence operates
through persuasion rather than delegation of decision-making responsibility.
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Introduction
The specter of the law clerk as a legal Rasputin, exerting an important
influence on the cases actually decided by the Court, may be discarded
at once. ... It is unreasonable to suppose that a lawyer in middle age or
older, of sufficient eminence in some walk of life to be appointed as one of
nine judges of the world’s most powerful court, would consciously abandon
his own views as to what is right and what is wrong in the law because a
stripling clerk just graduated from law school tells him to.
– William Rehnquist
The law is not made by judge alone, but by judge and company.
– Jeremy Bentham
The influence of law clerks on judicial decision-making at the U.S. Supreme
Court has been a perennial topic of interest among both academics and popular com-
mentators on the Court. The inner workings of Supreme Court justices’ chambers are
notoriously secretive, but interviews and writings by former clerks suggest that clerks
play an important role in the judicial opinion writing process—researching the facts of
the case and the relevant legal precedent, serving as emissaries to other chambers, and
even writing drafts of the opinions themselves. What remains hotly debated, however,
is whether clerks, who are often only a few years out of law school, influence the actual
votes cast by Supreme Court justices on the cases they hear.
Understanding the influence of clerks at the Supreme Court is crucial for
understanding the development of law and the political economy of the American ju-
diciary, but the secretive nature of the institution makes the topic difficult to study
empirically. Interviews with former clerks certainly suggest that clerks exert a signifi-
cant degree of influence over their justices in specific cases (Woodward and Armstrong,
2005; Ward and Weiden, 2006). However, this view may be colored by clerks’ ex-
aggerated sense of their own importance in the process (Toobin, 2007; Kozinki and
Bernstein, 1998) or may represent abberations from the norm.
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In addition, two problems have significantly stymied efforts to assess law
clerks influence on judicial decision making. The first is identification. In particular,
identifying the causal effect of clerks on justices’ voting behavior is challenging because
justices may choose to hire clerks who share their preferences over case outcomes,
making it difficult to distinguish the effect of a clerk from the effect of the justice’s
own ideology. The second is data. In particular, little information about Supreme
Court clerks’ preferences over case outcomes has been systematically collected, making
it difficult to assess whether clerks have exerted influence over justices vote.
To deal with the fact that the assignment of clerks to justices is not random
and that justices may seek out clerks who share their ideological preferences, we exploit
the timing of the Supreme Court clerk hiring process. Justices tend to decide on future
clerks well before the date that the clerkship begins, often early in the prior term or
even during the term two years before the actual clerkship begins. As a result, changes
in clerk ideology between two terms reflect changes in the justice’s ideology during
the prior two terms. In conjunction with the assumption that evolutions in judicial
ideology are characterized by a random-walk process (with or without secular drift),
this feature of the institution allows us to plausibly isolate the causal effect of clerk
ideology on judicial voting behavior.
To overcome the lack of data on Supreme Court clerk preferences over case
outcomes, we construct a novel measure of Supreme Court clerk political ideology. To
do so, we match the universe of Supreme Court clerks to the universe of political dona-
tions disclosed to the Federal Election Commission and arranged on a unidimensional
ideological scale by Bonica (2014). Although only about 5% of the general public have
made political donations, over 70% of the Supreme Court clerks in our sample have
done so. For those clerks who donated, these data provide a continuous measure of
ideological preferences as revealed by their actual donation decisions.
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Our analysis provides strong evidence that clerk ideology does affect judicial
voting behavior. Under our preferred specification, a standard deviation change in clerk
ideology is associated with approximately a 1 percentage point change in a justice’s
conservative vote share. To interpret the magnitude of this effect, our estimate suggests
that, on average, a justice would cast approximately 4% more conservative votes in a
term when employing his or her most conservative clerks, as compared to a term
in which the justice employs his or her most liberal clerks. We find larger effects in
cases that are higher profile (17%), cases that are legally significant (22%), and cases in
which the justices are more evenly divided (12%). We interpret these findings to provide
suggestive evidence that clerk influence operates through clerks persuading their justice
to follow the clerk’s preferred outcome, rather than through justices delegating decision-
making to clerks.
Our results contribute to important literatures in law, economics, and politi-
cal science. For example, an established literature in economics seeks to understand the
sources of judicial decision-making (Maskin and Tirole, 2004; Gennaioli and Shleifer,
2007; Baker and Mezzetti, 2012; Lim, 2013; Lim et al., 2015; Yang, 2015), with some
of this work focused on the Supreme Court in particular (e.g., Iaryczower and Shum,
2012). Similarly extensive literatures address these questions within the fields of polit-
ical science and law (for an overview, see Epstein et al., 2013).
Several recent papers have studied the role of clerks on the Supreme Court.
Peppers and Zorn (2008) studied the effect of clerk ideology on Supreme Court voting
by surveying former clerks on whether they identified as Democrats or Republicans.
Similarly, Kromphardt (2015) proxies for clerk ideology using the ideology of the judge
for whom the clerk previously worked. Although these papers report evidence for clerk
influence, neither does so on the basis of an empirical strategy that is robust to changes
in judicial ideology over time. As discussed below, specifications with this limitation
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run the risk of conflating clerk influence with secular changes in a justice’s voting
preferences over time—of the type that are commonly understood to occur (Epstein
et al., 2007). We build on these results by developing and constructing a better measure
of clerk ideology and by utilizing an identification strategy that is robust to changes in
judicial ideology over time.1
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides general
background about Supreme Court clerkships and describes potential mechanisms by
which clerks may influence judicial voting behavior. Section 2 describes our empirical
strategy. Section 3 describes our data and provides descriptive statistics. Section 4
presents our baseline results as well as additional analyses. Section 5 conducts robust-
ness checks relating to our identifying assumption, sample selection concerns, and the
stability of clerk ideology over time. Section 6 concludes.
1 Background and Mechanisms for Clerk Influence
Supreme Court clerkships are prestigious, one-year positions in which a clerk
works directly for an individual Supreme Court justice.2 Although justices are free to
hire whomever they wish, the justices typically select recent top graduates of America’s
most elite law schools. At least since the 1960s, these recent graduates have typically
served, or will serve, as a clerk for federal district or, more typically, federal appeals
1In addition to the studies described in this paragraph, a number of recent papers have used text
analysis to study the role of clerks in the writing of Supreme Court opinions by assessing changes in
writing style between terms (Wahlbeck et al., 2002; Choi and Gulati, 2005; Rosenthal and Yoon, 2011;
Li et al., 2013; Carlson et al., 2016).
2 A great deal has been written about the role of judicial law clerks at the Supreme Court. See
Peppers (2006) for an overview. Although the workings of Supreme Court chambers are largely confi-
dential, there are at least four ways that information has been made public. First, some academics and
journalists have been leaked information that has been used to write behind-the-scenes accounts of
Supreme Court decision-making (e.g., Woodward and Armstrong, 2005). Second, the papers of some
deceased justices—most notably Justice Blackmun—have been later publicly released (e.g., Green-
house, 2006). Third, a handful of clerks have written books or articles that recount their experiences
working at the Supreme Court (e.g., Lazarus, 2005). Finally, some justices have publicly spoken or
written about the inner workings of the court.
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court judge (Hutchinson, 1998; Rozema and Peng, 2015). Each term, the chief justice
can hire up to five clerks per term and associate justices can hire up to four clerks per
term (Peppers, 2012).3 In part to attract the best talent, the justices normally hire
clerks well before their clerkship begins, typically at the beginning of the prior judicial
term or earlier.
The specific responsibilities of clerks varies by justice and have evolved over
time (Newland, 1961; Baier, 1973; Peppers, 2006). The standard tasks that are assigned
to clerks include reviewing petitions for certiorari (i.e., which cases to hear), writing
memos that assess the merits of pending cases, helping the justices prepare for oral
arguments, and assisting in the drafting and editing of opinions. The clerks work in
close quarters with the justices and have frequent professional and social interactions
with the justices, ranging from formal meetings before oral arguments to lunches and
after-work happy hours.
As we noted before, a running debate concerns whether clerks influence the
voting of Supreme Court justices.4 There are at least two pathways for how such
influence could occur: delegation and persuasion. First, justices may delegate a num-
ber of responsibilities to clerks, such as reading the briefs submitted by the parties,
reading amicus briefs and lower court opinions, and conducting legal research about
3Retired justices may hire one clerk. These clerks help the retired justice with their remaining
workload—e.g. drafting opinions if the justice sits by designation on lower courts—for part of their
time and are assigned to work for an active justice for the remainder of the time. We discuss how we
account for the clerks that work for retired justices in Section 5.
4This debate has largely been motivated by prominent ancedotes and qualitative evidence. For
example, there are a number of widely known stories about clerks having swayed justices’ votes while
clerking. See, for instance, Tribe (1991) discussing his role in swaying the outcome of Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Garrow (2014) discussing the role of clerks in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), and Ward and Weiden (2006) discussing the influence of clerks on the outcome of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Additionally, some justices’ own behavior suggests that
they believe clerks influence their decisions. For instance, the fact that Justice Kennedy has at
times empowered a group of high profile conservative lawyers and judges to pre-screen clerks can
be interpreted as concern that liberal clerks may sway decisions, and the fact that Justice Scalia
often intentionally hired liberal “counter-clerks” may have reflected his belief that their ideological
perspective was valuable.
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related cases. Justices who delegate such responsibilities may have difficulty monitor-
ing whether clerks’ presentation of those facts and arguments are distorted by political
bias.5 For example, a clerk may—consciously or unconsciously—emphasize the facts
and arguments that best support his or her preferred outcome. It is through this kind
of delegation that a number of accounts of prior clerks, including Rehnquist (1957) and
Lazarus (2005), have argued that clerks are able to have influence. These delegation
stories of influence would suggest that clerk influence would be highest for justices
who delegate more frequently, and in relatively minor or uninteresting cases where the
justice was least engaged.
Second, clerks may influence Supreme Court voting by persuading justices to
vote in the direction preferred by the clerk. Clerks tend to have frequent access to the
justice for whom they work, and clerks may use that access to lobby the justice to vote
in their preferred direction. Along these lines, anecdotal evidence suggests that clerks
can influence a justice’s vote in the cases in which the justices feels to be a close call.
For example, Garrow (2014) and Ward and Weiden (2006) provide detailed accounts of
how clerks were able to influence justices when two important abortion rights cases—
Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey—were being decided. These persuasion
stories of influence would suggest that clerk influence would be highest in cases in which
the justices were less confident over which outcome was correct, and in cases where the
clerks were the most engaged.
It is important to note that the delegation and persuasion pathways of how
clerks exert influence are not mutually exclusive, nor are they the only possible path-
ways of clerk influence. For example, one possibility is that justices learn about the
personal lives of their clerks and are influenced via empathy (Glynn and Sen, 2015;
5A long literature in political science has considered how bureaucrats may use delegated authority
to enact their own preferences instead of the relevant political leader (e.g., Kiewiet and McCubbins,
1991; McCubbins et al., 1989, 1987).
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Washington, 2008). Alternatively, it could be the case that clerks both covertly shape
the information that is presented to justices in ways that changes voting and also overtly
persuade the justices to vote in a particular direction. Without detailed information on
the inner workings of the justices’ chambers—which is largely kept confidential—it is
difficult to empirically test the relative importance of these two mechanisms. Nonethe-
less, in addition to testing whether clerk ideology influences voting, we also provide
suggestive evidence along these lines below.
2 Empirical Framework
We model the conservativeness of a justice j’s voting in term t (yj,t) as a
function of the justice’s ideology during that term (dj,t) and the ideology of the clerks
hired by the justice during that term (cj,t) according to (1):
yj,t = βcj,t + dj,t (1)
for justice j in term t.6 Our goal is to estimate β, which captures the effect of clerk
ideology on a justice’s voting. The challenge for identification is that dj,t is unobserved.
In addition, dj,t is likely to be correlated with cj,t because justices may choose to hire
ideologically aligned clerks or because clerks seek to work for justices whose ideologies
they share (e.g., Liptak, 2010; Bonica et al., 2016b).
As a benchmark, suppose that judicial ideology is time-invariant, dj,t = dj.
In this case, one can obtain an unbiased estimate for β by estimating (1) in a model
with justice fixed effects. In practice, of course, a justice’s ideology may evolve over
6Because our focus is on the link between judicial and clerk ideology, Equation 1 abstracts away
from other factors that could affect how a justice votes during a particular term, such as case compo-
sition or idiosyncratic case-preferences. Our empirical implementation below, however, includes term
and issue-area fixed effects.
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time (Epstein et al., 2007), and if it does, this evolution can result in a biased estimate
for β. For example, a justice that grows increasingly liberal over time may hire more
liberal clerks at the end of her career than at the beginning, and also cast an increasing
number of liberal votes over this period.
To allow for idiosyncratic changes in judicial ideology from term to term, we
model dj,t as a random walk with drift:
7
dj,t = dj,t−1 + ηj,t + gj(t) (2)
in which innovations in a justice’s ideology (ηj,t) are assumed to be independent of
justice and clerk ideology in the prior term. This requirement is stated formally as:
Assumption 1
ηj,t ⊥ (dj,t−1, cj,t−1) (3)
To address the possibility that justices hire clerks based in part on the clerk’s
ideology, our empirical strategy relies on a useful institutional feature of the Supreme
Court clerkship hiring process during our sample period: that Supreme Court justices
typically hire their law clerks one to two terms before the clerkship begins. For example,
a clerk hired to work for a justice from July 2015 to June 2016 would likely be hired
sometime in 2014.8 It is this fact that permits identification of clerk influence given
the non-random assignment of clerks to justices.
More formally, suppose that the clerks hired for justice j in term t are a
function of the justice’s ideology during the prior term (the term in which the clerk is
7This is similar to the assumption made in other papers on judicial ideology, e.g., Martin and
Quinn (2002), who model the justices’ ideologies with a random walk prior.
8We discuss the robustness of our results to more conservative assumptions about the length of
the lag between clerk hire and employment in Section 5.
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hired):
cj,t = f(dj,t−1) + νj,t (4)
In (4), f(.) captures the potential dependence of a clerk’s ideology on the justice’s own
ideology at the time the clerk is hired. In turn, νj,t is a residual term, capturing all
other factors that shape which clerks a justice hires, such as the clerk’s grades and law
school attended.9 Our identifying assumption will be that this residual variation in the
clerks hired for term t is orthogonal to any innovations in judicial ideology that occur
between term t − 1 (when the clerks are selected) and term t (when the clerks begin
employment):
Assumption 2
νj,t ⊥ ηj,t (5)
Assumption 2 would fail if the term t clerks were hired based (in part) on the justice’s
term t ideology – for example, if justices could predict how their own ideology would
evolve in future years and hired clerks on the basis of that evolution, rather than
on their ideology at the time of the hire. In this case, ηj,t would appear as part of
νj,t. Similarly, the assumption would be violated if clerks tend to closely monitor the
ideology of the hiring justice after accepting an offer for future employment, adapting
his or her own ideology in response.10
Taken together, Assumptions 1 and 2 permit the unbiased identification of β
in (1). In particular, taking first differences of the variables in (1) between consecutive
9Factors that depend on the justice’s ideology in terms prior to t− 1, such as the clerks employed
by the justice during term t− 1, would also appear in νj,t.
10Another possibility is that an event could occur that simultaneously affects the ideology of the
justice and a newly selected (but not yet employed) clerk. For example, this might be a significant
political shock, such as an economic recession or terrorist attack, or the election of an unusual presi-
dential candidate. However, to the extent such events affect other justices as well, they will be picked
up in the term effects included in the specifications below.
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terms, and applying (2), yields:
∆yj,t = β∆cj,t + gj(t) + ηj,t (6)
Because ηj,t is unobserved, recovering β from (6) requires that cov(∆cj,t, ηj,t) = 0. From
(4), ∆cj,t = f(dj,t−1)− f(dj,t−2) + νj,t− νj,t−1. Assumption 2 implies cov(νj,t, ηj,t) = 0,
and Assumption 1 implies that the covariance of νj,t with the other components of
∆cj,t is 0. Consequently, when Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the econometric model we
estimate below yields an unbiased estimate for β.
To summarize, our identifying assumption is that, after accounting for trends,
the change in clerk ideology between two terms is uncorrelated with changes in justice
ideology between those same two terms. The reason this assumption is plausible in
our context is that clerks are hired well in advance of when the clerkship begins; as
a result, changes in clerk ideology between two terms are likely to be correlated with
changes in justice ideology during the prior two terms. And, if innovations in judicial
ideology are well-described by a random walk process (after accounting for trends),
changes in a justice’s ideology between two terms will be uncorrelated with changes
during the subsequent two terms.
3 Data
Our empirical analysis uses data on Supreme Court justice voting and the
ideology of Supreme Court clerks.
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3.1 Sources of Data
Supreme Court Vote Data Our outcome data is based on individual Supreme
Court justice votes on cases decided between 1960 and 2009, obtained from the Supreme
Court Database (Spaeth et al., 2015). Spaeth et al. hand code each vote as liberal, con-
servative, or “unspecifiable.” This measure is among the most widely used in empirical
analyses of judicial behavior (Epstein et al., 2013, 2005). In the present application,
we restrict our focus to cases coded as either liberal or conservative.11
Clerk Ideology Data To obtain data on clerk ideology, we matched the universe
of Supreme Court clerks (obtained from the Supreme Court Information Office) to the
universe of political donations disclosed by the Federal Election Commission and agen-
cies from state, local, and federal elections since 1979.12 The donations data include
approximately 100 million political donations. An individual’s political donations are
arranged on a unidimensional ideological scale by Bonica (2014) from extremely liberal
to extremely conservative. The scale is normalized so that it has a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 1 with respect to the population of U.S. donors. The resulting
campaign finance score (CFscore) reflects an individual’s ideology to the extent the
individual tends to make political donations to support candidates that share his or
her political beliefs.13
There are two concerns with using this data for clerk ideology in our applica-
tion. First, the measure is only available for clerks who donated at some point during
the time span covered by the political donations data (1979-2014), and such clerks may
differ in unobservable ways from the clerks that do not donate. We investigate issues
11This excludes 4,848 votes coded as “unspecifiable.”
12We report details of the matching process in the Technical Appendix.
13Bonica (2014) and Bonica and Sen (2016) provide provide evidence about the internal and ex-
ternal validity of using political donations as a measure of ideology.
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of sample selection in Section 5.2.
A second concern is that of those clerks who donate, very few do so before
their clerkship. As a result, we construct our measure of clerk ideology from donations
over the course of the clerk’s life. This may introduce measurement error if clerk ideol-
ogy changes between the time of the clerkship and the time that subsequent donations
are made. We investigate this concern in Section 5.3.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample. Column 1 presents
information on the distribution of conservative votes cast. Our sample includes 66,209
votes, of which 45.8 percent are coded as conservative. The standard deviation of votes
cast captures both within- and between- variation in the voting behavior of individual
justices. In contrast, the mean within-justice standard deviation captures the average
degree of variation in the direction of votes cast by a single justice—for instance, this
number would be zero if each conservative justice always cast conservative votes and
if each liberal justice always cast liberal votes.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Column 2 of Table 1 presents justice voting behavior at the justice-term
level. We observe 439 justice-term combinations in our sample. The conservative vote
shares in these terms range from 5.5% (Justice White in 1961) at the liberal end of the
spectrum to 77.9% (Justice Thomas in 2003) at the conservative end of the spectrum.
There is less variation in how an individual justice votes between terms than there is
between how different justices vote.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 present information on the distribution of clerk
CFscores, overall and by justice-term. The total number of individuals clerking for
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the Supreme Court during our sample period is 1,599, 72.2% of whom we match to an
individual record in the political donations data. The donation rate among Supreme
Court clerks is quite high compared to other groups; for comparison, the mean donation
rate among all Americans is 5% and among lawyers is 40% (Bonica et al., 2015). As
shown in Appendix Figure A1, most justice-terms are missing 0 to 1 clerks.14
Figure 1 presents the mean conservative vote share among Supreme Court
justices over time.15 The figure is consistent with the common understanding that the
Court was more conservative during the 1970s and 1980s (during the Burger Court)
compared to the 1960s (Warren Court). Notably, in addition to this broad trend, the
figure shows substantial year-to-year fluctuations in the mean share of conservative
votes.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Figure 2 presents information on the cases per term and clerks hired per
term during our sample period. The number of cases decided by the Supreme Court
each term has decreased substantially over time, from an average of 180 cases per term
in the 1960s to 92 cases per term in the 2000s. Over the same time period, the average
number of clerks employed by each justice has risen, from an average of 19 clerks per
term during the 1960s to 38 clerks per term during the 2000s.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Finally, Figure 3 presents the ideological distribution of the Supreme Court
clerks in our sample.16 The mean CFscore is -0.50. To put this in perspective, this
14Section A2.1 of the Supplementary Appendix presents detailed information about the match rate
by justice-term.
15Section A2.2 of the Supplementary Appendix presents information about voting by justice.
16Section A2.3 of the Supplementary Appendix presents the ideological distribution of clerks by
justice and the correlation between clerk and conservative vote share. For additional analysis and
discussion of this ideological distribution (as well as information on the ideological distribution of
lower court clerks), see Bonica et al. (2016a).
13
is comparable to Bill Clinton’s CFscore of -0.68. The figure is bimodal, and suggests
that the political alignment of Supreme Court clerks is consistent with the broader
two-party split in American politics.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
4 Results
4.1 Primary Results
In this section, we implement the empirical model based on the framework
developed in Section 2. We first consider a specification with justice fixed effects:
ycjt = α + β cj,t + µj + δt + ζ Xc + εcjt (7)
In (7), y indicates a conservative vote by justice j in term t on case c, cj,t denotes the
mean CFscore for the clerks employed by justice j in term t, µj denotes justice fixed
effects, δt denotes term fixed effects, Xc denotes a vector of case-level characteristics
(which we implement with issue-area fixed effects), and εcjt denotes the error term.
17
Standard errors are clustered at both the justice and case levels, following the two-
way clustering procedure described in Cameron et al. (2011) and Cameron and Miller
(2015). As discussed in Section 2, estimating (7) yields an unbiased estimate of β if
within-justice variation in ideology is uncorrelated with variation in the ideology of the
clerks hired by the justice.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
17We consider alternative specifications using median, minimum, and maximum clerk ideology per
term in Supplemental Table A3. Note that these specifications are robust to a hiring model in which
justices seek to hire “counter-clerks” with ideologies opposite to their own.
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The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2, Column 1. The esti-
mated coefficient on clerk ideology is positive and statistically significant. The point
estimate, 0.017, is the percentage point change in the conservative vote share associ-
ated with a one standard deviation shift in the mean political ideology of the clerks
hired by a justice in a term—a 3.7% change relative to the mean conservative vote
share of 0.46.
Column 2 of Table 2 adds justice-specific linear time trends. This specifica-
tion corresponds to setting gj(t) = gj ∗ t. As discussed in Section 2, the inclusion of
such a trend may alleviate the bias associated with changes in judicial ideology over
time. Including justice-specific time trends slightly attenuates the estimated coefficient
on clerk ideology, but the effect remains statistically significant.
We next turn to the first-differences model, which exploits the timing of the
Supreme Clerk hiring process to disentangle changes in judicial ideology from changes
in clerk ideological composition. Figure 5 plots changes in a justice’s conservative vote
share between consecutive terms against changes in the ideology of the clerks hired
by the justice in those terms.18 The figure suggests a moderate but positive-sloping
relationship: larger increases in the degree of clerk conservativeness are associated with
larger increases in the justice’s conservative vote share.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
Column 3 of Table 2 confirms this graphical evidence. The econometric
specification is given by:
∆yj,t = α
′ + β∆cj,t + δ′t + ε
′
jt (8)
18Appendix Figure A4 plots clerk ideology and conservative vote share, in levels.
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where ∆yj,t = yj,t − yj,t−1 and ∆cj,t = cj,t − cj,t−1. Note that (8) is estimated at the
justice-term, rather than the case-justice-term, level. Estimating (8) yields a point
estimate of 0.008, slightly smaller than the estimated effect reported in Column 2.
Finally, Column 4 of Table 2 incorporates a justice-specific linear time trend,
which we implement by adding a justice fixed effect to the first-differences model in
(8). The inclusion of a linear time trend is appropriate in the first-differences model
if judicial ideology is best characterized by a random walk with a justice-specific drift
term. As shown in Column 4, the point estimate increases slightly following this
addition, to approximately 0.010.
The results in Table 2 suggest the presence of a non-trivial effect of clerk
ideology on judicial voting behavior. Focusing on Column 4, which we will use as our
baseline specification for the analyses that follow, the coefficient indicates that replacing
the clerks employed by a justice in a term with clerks that are one standard deviation
more conservative increases the conservative vote share of that justice by approximately
1 percentage point. Put differently, replacing a judicial chambers composed of the
justice’s annual set of most liberal clerks with a judicial chambers composed of the
justice’s annual set of most conservative clerks would result in a 4% increase in the
number of conservative votes by the justice during the term.19
4.2 Additional Results and Possible Mechanisms
As discussed in Section 1, observing differences in clerk influence across case
types may offer clues as to the mechanisms by which clerks influence justice voting.
In particular, two possible channels through which clerks may influence justice voting
19We obtain this estimate by computing the within-justice difference in mean clerk ideology between
the term in which the justice employs his or her most liberal clerks and the term in which the justice
employs his or her most conservative clerks. We then average this difference across justices. The
reported percent change is obtained by multiplying the mean within-justice difference (1.96) by the
point estimate (0.010), and scaling by the mean fraction of conservative votes (0.468).
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are: (1) the justice effectively delegates decision-making on the case to the clerk, or (2)
the clerk persuades the justice to vote for the clerk’s preferred outcome. A delegation
channel suggests clerk influence should be greatest in cases where justices are least
engaged (and most willing to delegate) and among justices who assign the most opinion-
writing responsibility to clerks; by contrast, a persuasion channel would perhaps be the
most pronounced in the most important cases, where interest among the clerks might
be the highest and where they might derive the highest utility from the justices voting
in line with their preferences.
Table 3 explores these possibilities by comparing clerk influence across vari-
ous types of cases.20 Column 1 compares clerk influence in cases that are high profile to
those that are not, motivated by the fact that justices would be less likely to delegate
to clerks in cases that are relatively high profile. Following Epstein and Segal (2000),
we proxy for whether a case is high profile by whether it appears on the front page of
the New York Times.
In this analysis, there are two observations for each justice-term: one for
the high profile cases, and one for the cases that are not high profile. The empirical
specification is given by:
∆yjtu = α
′ + β∆cjt + γ piu ∆cjt + piu + δ′t + ε
′
jt (9)
where piu indicates whether the observation is composed of high profile cases.
The results in Column 1 are precisely the opposite of what a delegation
theory of clerk influence would predict. The main effect on clerk influence is close
to zero and statistically insignificant. In contrast, the interaction term is large and
statistically significant, suggesting that clerk influence is greatest in cases that are high
20Table A4 in the Supplemental Appendix presents summary statistics on the subgroups of cases
analyzed in this section.
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profile. Although inconsistent with the delegation theory of clerk influence, this finding
is consistent with the persuasion model—it could be that clerks are most motivated to
influence their justice in cases that are high profile.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Alternatively, a justice’s interest in a case—and willingness to delegate—may
depend not on whether the case is high profile, but on whether it is legally significant.
Column 2 repeats the analysis in Column 1, focusing on whether a case is classified as
“major” by Congressional Quarterly in terms of its legal significance.21 The results in
Column 2 provide strong evidence that clerk influence is strongest in legally significant
cases and virtually non-existent in other cases. Like Column 1, these results are difficult
to explain with a delegation model of influence, but consistent with a model by which
clerk influence operates through persuasion.
We next turn to the “closeness” of the case, which we measure based on how
much disagreement exists among the justices as to the correct outcome. As with high
profile cases and cases that are legally significant, one would expect that justices would
be least willing to delegate responsibility to clerks in cases where the justices disagree
with one another. Column 3 investigates how clerk influence varies between unanimous
and non-unanimous cases. Here, the entire effect of clerk influence appears driven by
non-unanimous cases.
Although the finding that clerk influence is driven by non-unanimous cases
may provide evidence against delegation theories of clerk influence, it may also simply
reflect the fact that there is a ceiling effect in unanimous cases and hence little scope
for clerks to influence the outcome. However, a delegation theory of influence would
21While the New York Times measure captures the attention a case received when it was handed
down, the “CQ” measure is based on experts’ retroactive assessment of whether a case was a landmark
decision. Both measures have previously been used by scholars as proxies for important Supreme Court
cases (Epstein and Segal, 2000; Fowler et al., 2007).
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nonetheless predict that among non-unanimous cases, clerk influence would be greater
in relatively uncontroversial cases as opposed to relatively controversial ones. Because
of this, Column 4 focuses on “close” cases, which we define as cases where the outcome is
decided by a vote of 5-4 or 6-3. The results suggest that clerk influence is entirely driven
by close cases. Overall, we interpret the results in Table 3 as being more consistent
with persuasion models of influence than with delegation models of influence.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
Figure 5 provides graphical evidence that supports the results in Table 3.
The figure plots changes in a justices conservative vote share in consequential terms
against changes in the ideology of their clerks stratified by whether cases meet a given
criteria, as indicated in the title of each of the figures. It provides binned scatterplots,
which reveal positive relationships for changes in cases that are higher profile, legally
significant, and closely decided.
Table 4 reports the results of our primary specification by issue area. Al-
though the smaller number of cases increases the variability of the results, the results
suggest that the largest impact of clerk ideology occurs in first amendment and civil
rights cases. In these areas, a one standard deviation increase in the conservativeness
of a justice’s clerks in a term results in a 3.4 and 2.5 percentage point increase in
the conservative vote share on these issues. There are several possible interpretations
of these results. For instance, it may be that clerks are most passionate about first
amendment and civil rights issues, and so are most motivated to influence their justices
on these types of cases. Alternatively, it may be that these are the issue areas about
which justices look for the most help from their clerks, or where the legal doctrines are
the most vague and thus provide the greatest opportunity for persuasion.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
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Finally, Table 5 turns from characteristics of the case to characteristics of the
justice in determining the factors that shape clerk influence. Column 1 investigates
whether clerks are more influential when they work for justices who have the clerk
author first drafts of their opinions. For this specification, we rely on Peppers and
Zorn (2008)’s coding of the job duties that each justice gives their clerks. Although
the outcomes of the decisions are typically decided by the point in time at which
opinions are drafted,22 this variable may proxy the degree of responsibility the justice
assigns to clerks generally, or, less charitably, the justice’s own disengagement from
the process. The results of the analysis, reported in Column 1, are consistent with
the hypothesis that clerks exert more influence when working for justices who involve
clerks more heavily in the opinion-writing process.23 However, we do not wish to make
too much of this analysis, as all recent Supreme Court justices delegate the writing of
opinion drafts to their clerks, so this effect is identified solely off of the four justices in
our sample period who did not follow this practice.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Column 2 of Table 5 investigates clerk influence by variation in the extent to
which the justice relies on the clerk during the writing process. For this analysis, we
rely on a measure known as the “Vscore” developed by Rosenthal and Yoon (2011).
To create the measure, Rosenthal and Yoon analyzed the text of justices’ opinions to
22It is worth noting that justices do occasionally change their mind after the opinions have been
assigned to be written. For example, in one prominent recent case, it has been reported that Chief
Justice John Roberts changed his vote the case deciding the constitutionality of the Affordable Care
Act: National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. (2012) (Barnett, 2012;
Crawford, 2012). In another example, future-judge Richard Posner apparently swayed the outcome of
Sanders v. U.S., 373 U.S. 1 (1963) while clerking for Justice Brennan by misunderstanding Brennan’s
instructions and producing a draft opinion that supported the opposite outcome as what the justices
had agreed to in conference. However, Brennan and the other justices were sufficiently convinced by
the draft to change their votes.
23The estimated coefficient on the interaction term for clerk ideology and workload reported in
Table 5 (corresponding to the specification in Column 4 of Table 2) is positive, but not statistically
significant. The estimated coefficients (not reported) from the specifications corresponding to Columns
1 to 3 of Table 2 are similar in magnitude and statistically significant.
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estimate each justices’ variability in writing style from term to term. Higher Vscores are
associated with higher variability, and as Rosenthal and Yoon argue, suggest higher
reliance on clerks during the writing process. Our results are consistent with the
hypothesis that the effect of clerk ideology increases for justices who rely more heavily
on clerks to draft their opinions, but the estimated coefficient is imprecisely estimated.
Column 3 of Table 5 investigates differences in clerk influence across liberal
and conservative justices, as measured by whether the justice’s conservative vote share
is below the sample median. The results suggest that the effect of clerk influence on
judicial voting is quite similar across justices on both sides of the ideological divide.
Finally, Columns 4 and 5 of Table 5 investigates clerk influence by years of
experience on the bench and justice age.24 There may be concerns that justices overly
rely on their clerks at the beginning of their career because of their limited experience
or at the end of their career because of their advantaged age. The results provide no
evidence that clerk influence varies over the course of a justices career.
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Investigating Identifying Assumptions
As discussed in Section 2, a positive correlation between clerk ideology and
judicial voting may simply reflect unobserved variation in judicial ideology. Our identi-
fication strategy addresses this concern by exploiting the timing of the Supreme Court
clerk hiring process to disentangle the effect of the clerks from unobserved changes in
judicial ideology. This section investigates whether the assumptions underlying this
approach are likely to hold.
24Because judicial experience and justice age are perfectly colinear with the justice fixed effects in
this first difference model, we do not include a main effect for experience in this analysis.
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Our first check compares the timing of a change in voting behavior to the
time that a given set of clerks works for a justice. If changes in clerk ideology and
changes in voting behavior were both driven by changes in judicial ideology, we would
expect changes in voting behavior to appear prior to the clerk’s arrival, and persist
in the years following the clerks’ departure. That is, a justice who was more liberal
in term t would also tend to be more liberal in the years before and after term t. In
contrast, if the change in voting behavior in term t was primarily driven by the clerks
employed by the justice in term t, we would expect the change in voting behavior to
be largely confined to term t itself.
Figure 6 presents a placebo test of the association between judicial voting
in tern t and clerk ideology in each term during the five terms before and after term
tern t, using our preferred specification (Column 4 in Table 2). The results suggest
that the association between clerk ideology and judicial voting is largely confined to
the term in which the clerks are employed; the estimated coefficient for every other
term is smaller in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The figure
thus provides evidence for the source of the observed effect on voting behavior being
the clerks themselves rather than a change in judicial ideology.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
Our second check investigates the robustness of our results to a partial failure
of the hiring timing assumption underlying our identification strategy. Specifically, we
have assumed that the clerks employed in term t are hired based on the justice’s
ideology in or before term t− 1. In practice, however, cases are decided gradually over
the course of a term, and changes in judicial ideology may occur gradually over the
course of a term as well. If a substantial number of term t− 1 cases are decided before
the term t clerk is hired (which can occur when clerks are hired less than one year
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prior to their clerkship start date or when some term t− 1 cases are actually decided
in term t − 2), changes in clerk ideology between t − 1 and t may be correlated with
changes in judicial ideology over the same period.
To investigate this concern, we conducted a survey of former Supreme Court
clerks.25 Specifically, we randomly selected a sample of 10% of the clerks in our dataset
and searched for those clerks’ email addresses using the information from our dataset.
We were able to successfully identify the email addresses of 102 former clerks (65% of
our random sample). We then emailed these clerks and asked when they were offered
their clerkship and when they started their clerkship. In total, 66 people responded
to our survey, of which 62 were able to provide some information about when they
were offered their clerkship. The mean hiring date was 10 months before the clerkship
began. In addition, 25% of respondents reported having been hired over 12 months
prior to when their clerkship began, and 80% reported having been hired prior to the
beginning of the calendar year in which their clerkship began.
Because it appears that many clerks are hired after the start of the prior
year’s term, we consider a restriction of our analysis to cases that are decided relatively
late in the term, after the subsequent year’s clerks are likely to have been hired. Panel
A of Table 6 implements this robustness check by replicating Table 2 while restricting
the sample to cases argued between January through June.26 Although the standard
errors increase slightly, the point estimates remain similar in magnitude and for the
most part remain statistically significant, suggesting that violations of our assumptions
about the clerk hiring process are not driving the results.
Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests that clerk hiring has moved earlier and
earlier over time, so that even if our timing assumptions do not hold for the early years
25Section A2.6 of the Supplementary Appendix presents more information about this survey.
26Recall that clerks are typically hired to work for a single year term, beginning and ending in the
summer months between terms.
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of the sample, they are likely to hold by the end of the sample. Thus, any bias is likely
restricted to the early part of the sample. Panel B of Table 6 restricts the analysis to
the second half of our sample. The results provide evidence that our main findings are
not driven by a bias in the early years.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
5.2 Accounting for Missing Data
Because our measure of clerk ideology is based on clerks’ political donations,
clerks who have never made a political donation are missing from our analysis (28
percent of clerks during our sample). This subsection investigates the possibility that
this sample selection biases our estimates. In general, missing clerk ideology data
may bias our results by introducing measurement error into our measure of the mean
ideology of the clerks employed by a justice during a given term. This measurement
error may be classical, in which case it is likely to attenuate our estimated coefficients,
or it may be correlated with clerk ideology, potentially resulting in other forms of bias.
This section investigates the effect of the missing data under three possible assumptions.
Ideology Missing at Random As a baseline, it may be the case that clerks’ propen-
sity to donate is uncorrelated with their ideology, meaning that the missing clerks are
drawn from the same ideological distribution as the clerks we observe. In this case, the
missing data causes us to mis-measure clerk ideology, but because the data are effec-
tively missing completely at random, the measurement error will be classical, biasing
our estimated coefficient towards zero.
To provide a sense for the magnitude of the attenuation bias, we conduct
a simulation exercise in which we back out the true treatment effect size that would
generate our observed results, given the degree of missing data we observe and the
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assumption that the data is missing at random. Specifically, we implement the following
algorithm: (1) select a hypothetical treatment effect; (2) fill in the missing clerk-level
data by drawing at random without replacement from the distribution of observed
clerks hired by the same justice as the missing clerk; (3) generate predicted voting data
based on the hypothetical treatment effect from Step 1 and the new clerk data from
Step 2; (4) randomly drop clerk-level observations so that the degree of missing data
is the same as in the true data; (5) estimate our baseline first-differences specification
(Column 4 of Table 2). Intuitively, this process generates data assuming a particular
treatment effect, and then generates measurement error of the form we observe to
estimate the likely degree of attenuation bias. We repeat this process 1,000 times for
a given assumed treatment effect and take the mean estimated coefficient from Step
5. If this mean treatment effect matches our observed treatment effect, it suggests
that the hypothetical treatment effect chosen in Step 1 may characterize the true
data generating process for our sample. In contrast, if the mean treatment effect that
emerges from this process is too large or too small, we adjust the hypothetical treatment
effect in Step 1 and begin the process again. This algorithm converges on an estimated
effect size of 0.020, consistent with the theory that the measurement error from the
missing clerk data causes attenuation bias.
Ideology Missing at Random, Conditional on Observables The second pos-
sibility we consider is that the ideology of the clerks who do not donate may differ
systematically from the clerks that do, but that other information can be leveraged to
predict the ideology of clerks that do not donate. Although we do not observe dona-
tions for the missing clerks, we do observe other information about them that can be
used to predict their ideology, such as their gender and which law school they attended.
Following Bonica et al. (2016b), we impute the ideology of the missing clerks based on
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their observable characteristics. The details of the imputation procedure are reported
in the Technical Appendix. The results of the analysis using the imputed data are
presented in Column 1 of Table 7. The point estimate and standard error are largely
unchanged from our baseline specification.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Next, we proxy the ideology of the unobserved clerks using information about
the ideology of the prior judge who employed the clerk prior to the Supreme Court
justice.27 For this analysis, we use the Judicial Common Space (JCS) ideology measure
of the prior judge.28 The results are presented in Column 2 of Table 7. As above, the
results are largely unchanged by the addition of this additional clerk data, but the
estimated coefficient increases relative to our baseline specification.
Ideology Missingness Reflects Preference Intensity The third possibility we
consider is that there may be systematic ideological differences between donating and
non-donating clerks, and that these differences are not fully captured by the character-
istics of the clerks we observe or by the ideology of the judge for whom they previously
clerked. One possibility along these lines is that the clerks who donate, and are thus in
our data, hold more intense ideological preferences than those who do not donate. This
would be, for example, the difference between a clerk who “leans Republican” versus
one who is “strongly Republican.” Variation in the intensity of ideological preferences
could translate into missingness in the data and could also affect the influence of the
clerk on judicial decision making.
27Kromphardt (2015) employs a similar approach to measure clerk ideology.
28JCS scores are calculated from the ideology of the political actors responsible for their nomination
(Epstein et al., 2007). Specifically, the judge’s JCS score reflects the ideology of the appointing
President, or, if the President and the home-state Senator at the time of nomination are of the same
party, then of the home-state Senator (or an average of the two home-state Senators, if both are of
the same party).
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To provide intuition as to how variation in donating behavior driven by vari-
ation in ideological intensity would affect our results, we derive a back-of-the-envelope
adjustment to correct for this source of missingness. In particular, suppose that the
mean ideology of the clerks who donate is ρ times greater than the ideology of the
clerks who do not, cUjt = ρ cjt, where c
U
jt denotes the (unobserved) ideology of the clerks
employed by justice j in term t, and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. In this case, the true ideology of the
clerks hired in a justice-term, c∗jt, is given by
c∗jt = (1− µ) cjt + µ cUjt
where µ denotes the fraction of clerks in the sample whose ideology is unobserved.
Under this assumption, it is straightforward to show that the coefficient estimated
from the observed clerk data must be scaled by a factor of 1
1−µ(1−ρ) to obtain the true
effect of clerk ideology on judicial outcomes.29 Setting µ = 0.278 (which corresponds to
the degree of missingness in our data) and applying this adjustment to our estimated
coefficient from the baseline first-differences model yields an adjusted coefficient that
ranges from 1 percentage point (corresponding to ρ = 1) to 1.4 percentage points
(corresponding to ρ = 0). In words, the greater the degree to which the ideological
intensity of the clerk that do not donate are attenuated relative to the clerks that do,
the larger the true coefficient is.
Notably, since ρ ≤ 1, it will always be the case that the adjustment is
weakly greater than 1. In other words, the adjustment highlights that for our observed
coefficient to be larger in magnitude than the true effect, it must be the case that
the clerks who do not donate actually have more intense preferences, on average, than
those that do donate. Thus our unadjusted results may plausibly be interpreted as a
29The Technical Appendix provides this calculation.
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lower bound for the true effect, with the corresponding upper bound given by 0.013.
Consistent with the upper bound derived through this adjustment, Column 3 of Table
7 shows that assuming an ideology of 0 for each clerk who did not donate yields an
estimated effect of 1.1 percentage points.
In summary, missing data is likely to moderately bias the size of our esti-
mated coefficients towards zero but is unlikely to be driving our finding of a non-zero
effect.
5.3 Changes in Clerk Ideology
A third potential issue with our approach stems from the fact that our mea-
sure of clerk ideology is derived from all political donations made by a clerk, not just
those in the year of the clerkship. This section investigates whether changes in clerk
ideology over time may bias our results.
First, an initial concern is that contributions made later in life may not reflect
the ideology of the clerk at the time of their clerkship. To explore this possibility,
we tested the robustness of our results by using a measure of ideology that is based
on donations in a limited time window after the clerkship. Instead of measuring a
clerk’s ideology based on the clerk’s contributions over his or her lifetime, the analysis
in Supplemental Table A5 is based on the clerk’s contributions that occur within 5
years of the clerkship. Presumably, such contributions are a better reflection of the
clerk’s ideology during the clerkship than are contributions made later in life. The
estimated effect of clerk ideology resulting from this analysis is slightly greater than
the estimated effect from our baseline specification and, despite the smaller sample
size, is more precisely estimated.
Second, another concern is that the justice a clerk works for influences the
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evolution of the clerk’s ideology in future years—e.g., clerks who work for liberal jus-
tices might become more liberal after the clerkship.30 Because our identification strat-
egy exploits within-justice variation in clerk ideology, endogenous ideological evolution
among clerks is unlikely to be generating our results. That is, one key assumption for
us is that if clerks A and B worked for the same justice, and A is more liberal than
B after the clerkship, then A would tend to have been more liberal than B during
the clerkship as well. This observation is supported by the finding from the political
science literature that an individual’s ideology tends to be stable over time (e.g., Green
et al., 2004; Bonica, 2014).
To investigate the possibility that justices influence clerk ideology, we take
advantage of the relatively small fraction of clerks who donate both before and after
their clerkship. Because so few Supreme Court clerks fall into this category, this
analysis also uses data on clerks from federal district and circuit courts, from 1995
to 2004, described in Bonica et al. (2016a). The results of this analysis, presented
in Supplemental Table A6, confirm that post-clerkship ideology is strongly correlated
with pre-clerkship ideology, and provide no evidence that the ideology of a clerk’s
justice influences the clerk’s subsequent ideological evolution. One caveat to this result,
however, is that it’s quite possible that clerks that donate before their clerkship have
more fixed ideologies than clerks that only donate after their clerkship.
Third, a final concern is that clerk ideology may evolve in future years ac-
cording to the manner in which the justice votes during the term in which the clerk
is employed. The story here would be that a clerk employed in a term in which the
30As we demonstrate in this section, we find no evidence that such a pattern is driving our results.
However, as we have shown, we find evidence of the reverse relationship—that clerks influence justices.
This tension can be explained by the fact that we are not examining the influence of clerks on the
justices’ ideologies, but, rather, the influence of clerks on the justices’ voting on specific cases and
during specific terms. Whether clerks influence justices’ ideological leanings over time is an issue we
leave to future research.
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justice voted liberally in a large fraction of cases would become more liberal over time
compared to a different clerk who worked for the same justice but who was employed
during a term in which the justice voted conservatively in more cases. This evolution
might occur because of cognitive dissonance—helping to defend the justice’s conserva-
tive positions might make an impressionable clerk more conservative, and vice-versa.
Although theoretically possible, this mechanism seems unlikely to be large enough to
be responsible for much of our estimated effect, given the observed stickiness of politi-
cal ideology. That is, to explain our effect, it would need to be the case that working
on a slightly more conservative set of cases in one term (approximately 1%) could shift
clerks’ ideologies by one standard deviation—a dramatically larger effect than is associ-
ated with moving from liberal to conservative cities (Bonica, 2016), large fluctuations
in wealth (Bonica and Rosenthal, 2016), or changes in ideology by age (Ghitza and
Gelman, 2014).
As an additional check that reverse causation is not driving our results,
we constructed an instrument for clerk ideology based on characteristics of the clerk
that are fixed prior to the beginning of the Supreme Court clerkship, namely, law
school, judge of prior-clerkship, and clerk gender. The instrument is valid if these
characteristics do not affect judicial voting apart from their association with clerk
ideology. To construct the instrument, we regressed clerk CFscores on indicators for
top 14 law schools, indicators for court of appeals judges who sent at least than two
clerks to the Supreme Court, and gender. In particular, we ran separate regressions for
each clerk, where we exclude the clerk in question from the regression, and then obtain a
predicted CFscore of the excluded clerk’s ideology. We then use the predicted CFscore
as an instrument for observed clerk ideology in a two-stage least squares regression.
The point estimate from this analysis is 0.012, similar to our preferred specification,
but the standard error increases substantially relative to the non-IV analysis, so that
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the coefficient is not statistically different from 0. The results are reported in Table
A7 in the Supplementary Appendix.
5.4 Retired Justices’ Clerks
A unique institutional feature of the Supreme Court is that retired justices
are able to hire one clerk each year, and these clerks are often assigned to spend part
of their time working for an active justice that did not directly hire them. It is possible
the presence of these clerks in an active justices’ chamber may influence their voting.
To investigate whether this institutional feature biases our results, we searched for each
clerk employed by a retired justice to find the other justice they worked for doing the
term. By looking up the clerks’ professional biographies, we were able to identify the
active justice for 66 of the 93 clerks that were employed by retired justices. We then
re-estimated our primary results while assigning these clerks to the active justice they
spent part of their time working for. As Supplemental Table A8 shows, doing so does
not substantively change our primary results.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied whether law clerks affect how Supreme Court
justices vote. We find strong evidence that they do. For major cases, and for cases
where the justices are close to evenly divided, the influence of clerks is even greater.
When interpreting our results, several factors suggest the actual effect of clerk
ideology may be greater than what our point estimates suggest. First, as discussed
above, the measurement error induced by the fact that some clerks are not observed to
make political donations likely attenuates our estimated coefficient. Our discussion in
that section suggests that accounting for that bias would inflate our estimated effect
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by up to 40 percent.
Second, our specifications assume that the influence of clerk ideology occurs
at the justice-term level, with each clerk contributed equally to the disposition of each
case. This assumption is appropriate if each clerk has an equal opportunity to weigh
in on each case that the justice decides, but will be violated if certain clerks influence
a particular decision more than others. For example, cases are often assigned to a
primary clerk to work on, and the effect of a clerk’s ideology may be greatest on cases
for which that clerk has been assigned. The measurement error associated with this
misspecification could further attenuate our estimated coefficients.
Third, we have focused on measuring clerk influence along one particular
dimension in which clerk preferences differ (political ideology), but clerks may influence
Supreme Court decision-making in other ways as well (e.g., commitment to precedent).
Similarly, in addition to case outcomes, clerks may influence the breadth of judicial
decisions, which cases are selected for consideration, and the legal analysis employed
in the opinion itself. Such questions are important topics for future research.
Finally, although our focus has been on providing a descriptive account of
clerkship influence, our results speak to important normative issues as well. For exam-
ple, judges have been criticized for excessively relying on clerks. There are two reasons
for this. First, unlike judges, clerks are neither democratically elected nor confirmed by
a democratically elected body (Clark, 1959). Second, clerks, being recent law school
graduates, have limited legal and practical experience, which would tend to reduce
the quality of work that is delegated to them (Posner, 1983). These arguments are
stronger in a world in which judges delegate their decision-making powers to clerks di-
rectly, and weaker in a world in which judges—like government officials in other parts
of government—rely on staff for input but ultimately make the important decisions
themselves. Thus to the extent our results support persuasion over delegation models
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of clerkship influence, our findings suggest the influence of clerks is less troubling than
one might otherwise believe.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Conservative Vote Clerk Ideology
Overall Term Overall Term
Mean 0.458 0.468 -0.502 -0.521
Min 0 0.055 -1.775 -1.775
Max 1 0.779 1.440 1.376
St. Dev. 0.498 0.163 0.976 0.788
Within-Justice
St. Dev. 0.476 0.072 0.802 0.564
Obs. 66209 439 1155 498
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Table 2: Influence of Clerk Ideology on Justice Voting
Conservative Vote ∆ Conservative Votes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Clerk Ideology 0.017∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.003)
∆ Clerk Ideology 0.008∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Covariates
Term FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Justice FE Yes Yes No Yes
Justice Time Trends No Yes No No
N 66,209 66,209 404 404
R2 0.129 0.134 0.500 0.535
Mean Conservative Votes 0.458 0.458 0.468 0.468
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Columns (1) and
(2): standard errors clustered by justice and case. Specifications include issue area fixed
effects. Columns (3) and (4): standard errors clustered by justice.
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Table 3: Heterogeneous Effects: Case Attributes
Major Case Controversial
NYT CQ Unanimous Close
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Clerk Ideology 0.002 -0.003 0.021∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006)
Major Case -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.004)
Major Case 0.039∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗
× ∆ Clerk Ideology (0.011) (0.021)
Unanimous Case 0.009∗∗∗
(0.003)
Unanimous Case -0.028∗∗∗
× ∆ Clerk Ideology (0.009)
Close Case -0.005
(0.004)
Close Case 0.037∗∗∗
× ∆ Clerk Ideology (0.012)
N 807 807 808 806
R2 0.261 0.286 0.37 0.249
Mean Conservative Votes 0.447 0.437 0.461 0.471
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Column
(1): NYT indicates a case appeared on the front page of the New York Times. Column
(2): CQ indicates a case is classified as “major” by Congressional Quarterly in terms of its
legal significance. Column (3): Unanimous indicates whether the decision was unanimous.
Column (4): Close Case indicates the vote on the decision was 5-4 or 6-3.
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Table 5: Heterogeneous Effects: Justice Attributes
Workload Vscore Ideology Experience Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ Clerk Ideology -0.006 0.001 0.010∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.023
(0.011) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.037)
Workload 0.018
× ∆ Clerk Ideology (0.011)
Vscore 0.015
× ∆ Clerk Ideology (0.012)
Liberal Justice -0.001
× ∆ Clerk Ideology (0.009)
Experience -0.000
× ∆ Clerk Ideology (0.001)
Age -0.000
× ∆ Clerk Ideology (0.001)
N 404 404 404 404 404
R2 0.518 0.517 0.515 0.516 0.535
Mean Conservative Votes 0.468 0.468 0.468 0.468 0.468
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Workload indicates
whether clerks author the first drafts of a justice’s opinions. Vscore estimates each justices’ variability in
writing style from term to term, which has been used as a proxy for reliance on clerks during the writing
process (Rosenthal and Yoon, 2011). Liberal Justice indicates the justice’s conservative vote share is
below the sample median. Experience indicates the number of years the justice has been on the bench.
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Table 6: Timing Assumptions
Conservative Vote ∆ Conservative Votes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Cases After December
Clerk Ideology 0.017∗∗∗ 0.010∗
(0.006) (0.006)
∆ Clerk Ideology 0.008 0.010∗
(0.005) (0.005)
N 32,206 32,206 403 403
R2 0.127 0.132 0.456 0.463
Mean Conservative Votes 0.461 0.461 0.469 0.469
B. Cases in Last 25 Years
Clerk Ideology 0.014∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.005) (0.008)
∆ Clerk Ideology 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
N 26,243 26,243 204 204
R2 0.112 0.114 0.545 0.562
Mean Conservative Votes 0.507 0.507 0.511 0.511
Covariates
Term FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Justice FE Yes Yes No Yes
Justice Time Trends No Yes No No
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Columns (1) and (2):
standard errors clustered by justice and case. Specifications include issue area fixed effects.
Columns (3) and (4): standard errors clustered by justice. Panel A restricts the sample to
cases argued in January through June, after the subsequent year’s clerk will almost always
have been hired. See Figure ?? and text description. Panel B restricts to the last 25 years
of the sample, during a time in which clerks are usually hired at least on term before the
clerkship begins.
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Table 7: Investigating Selection
Fill in Missing With
Imputed JCS Score Zeros
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Clerk Ideology 0.009∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.011∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
N 404 404 404
R2 0.512 0.529 0.513
Mean Conservative Votes 0.468 0.468 0.468
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05,
∗∗∗ p<0.01. Column (1) reports the results for imputed clerk ideology
of the missing clerks, based on their observable characteristics. See the
Technical Appendix for details of the imputation procedure. Column
(2) reports the results using as a proxy for unobserved clerk ideology
the the ideology of the prior judge who employed the clerk prior to the
Supreme Court justice. Column (3) reports the results using a CFscore
of 0 for unobserved clerks.
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Figures
Figure 1: Conservative Votes by Term
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Figure 2: Number of Cases and Clerks By Term
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Figure 3: Supreme Court Clerk Ideology
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Figure 4: Influence of Clerk Ideology on Justice Voting
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Figure 5: Influence of Clerk Ideology on Justice Voting
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Figure 6: Placebo Tests
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A1 Technical Appendix
A1.1 Match Process
We matched the clerkship identity data to political donations in the Database
on Ideology, Money, and Elections (DIME) by way of a two-step matching process.
First, because the identifying information reported in the clerkship data was limited to
name, law school attended, and year of graduation, we initially matched the clerkship
data to the Martindale-Hubbell directory, a comprehensive database of attorneys in
the United States today. Given the much smaller population of lawyers as compared
to donors, a small amount of information (name, law school, and year of law degree)
was sufficient to uniquely match most clerks against records in the Martindale-Hubbell
directory.
Next, we matched the individuals matched to the Martindale-Hubbell direc-
tory to DIME, based on first, last, and middle name; suffix; title; address; and firm or
employer. To adjust for variations across records, we used the Jaro-Winkler algorithm,
which measures the distance between two strings (in this case, names); the lesser the
distance, the more alike two strings are.
A1.2 Imputation of Missing Ideology Data
Using a nonparametric missing value imputation process based on a random
forest model (Stekhoven and Buhlmann, 2012), we impute missing CFscores for clerks.
The procedure is a machine-learning approach that accounts for nonlinearities and
interactions between variables and proceeds in an iterative fashion, and accounts for
variables that are only partially observed.
We include a number of attributes to impute clerk CFscores, including: (1)
gender, (2) law school attended, (3) state in which lower court judges which employed
the clerk is located, (4) the lower judge’s own estimated CFscore, (5) the identity of the
president who appointed the lower court hiring judge, (6) attributes of the clerk later
in life (e.g., employment type, current state of residence). See Bonica et al. (2016b)
for a more detailed description of the dataset and how we obtained these additional
variables for clerks, and see Bonica et al. (2016a) for more details of the imputation.
A1.3 Derivation of Adjustment for Missing Ideology Data
Let µ denote the fraction of the clerks with missing ideology scores. Suppose
the mean ideology of the unobserved clerks in a justice-term is equal to ρ times the
mean ideology of the observed clerks in that justice-term,
cUjt = ρ cjt (10)
where ρ < 1 corresponds to the case in which clerks with more intense ideological
preferences are more likely to donate.
True clerk ideology in a justice-term is given by c∗jt = (1−µ)cjt+µcUjt, i.e., the
weighted average of the observed and unobserved clerks. Using (10), we can re-write
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this to obtain:
cjt =
c∗jt
1− µ+ ρµ (11)
Judicial voting in a justice-term is a function of the true clerk ideology in a
justice-term, yjt = βc
∗
jt + εjt, or, using (11):
yjt = β(1− µ+ ρµ) cjt + εjt (12)
Consequently, regressing voting behavior (yjt) on observed clerk ideology
(cjt) yields an estimated coefficient of βˆ = β(1 − µ + ρµ). The true effect of clerk
influence on judicial voting can thus be obtained by scaling the estimated coefficient:
β =
βˆ
1− µ+ ρµ
In our data, µ = 0.278 and βˆ = 0.010 in our preferred specification, implying
a true coefficient for clerk influence given by β = 0.010
0.722+.278∗ρ . Thus, depending on
the value of ρ (i.e., the degree to which variation in contribution rates are driven by
variation in the intensity of clerks’ ideological preference), the value of β lies between
0.010 and 0.014.
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A2 Supplementary Appendix
The Supplementary Appendix provides additional information on eight top-
ics. First, Section A2.1 provides information on the rate of missing ideology data in
our sample. Figure A1 reports the distribution of the number of missing clerks at the
justice-term level. Table A1 provides a breakdown of the number of observed and total
clerks at the justice-term level.
Second, Section A2.2 reports more details related to justice voting and their
clerks. Table A2 reports the Justice information on the number of terms present in the
sample, the number of votes cast, and the percent of votes cast that were conservative.
It also reports the number of clerks hired, the proportion of clerks observed, and the
mean ideology of the clerks.
Third, Section A2.3 provides more details on the distribution of clerk CFs-
cores within justices. Figure A2 reports the distribution of clerk CFscores by justice.
Figure A3 plots the clerk-level CFscores over time along with the mean annual CFscore
by justice. Figure A4 provides binned scatterplot of annual justice voting and mean
clerk CFscore.
Fourth, Section A2.4 provide alternative results using alternative statistics of
annual clerk CFscores. Table A3 reports the main results using the median, minimum,
and maximum clerk CFscore as the primary independent variable.
Fifth, Section A2.5 provides details on conservative voting by subgroup. Ta-
ble A4 reports the mean conservative vote share and the proportion of cases within
subgroups used in the analysis in the paper.
Sixth, Section A2.6 provides details of the survey we conducted on the timing
of Supreme Court clerk hiring. It also contains the wording of the email we sent to
a random sample of clerks. Figure A5 provides the distribution of lag times between
when a clerk reported having been hired and when the clerkship began.
Seventh, Section A2.7 tests the stability of clerk ideology over time. Table
A5 reports the results of regressions restricting clerk donations to those that occurred
within (or before) five years after the clerkship. Table A7 investigates reverse causation
by constructing an instrument for clerk ideology. It reports the results of regressions
using an instrument for clerk ideology based on characteristics of the clerk that are fixed
prior to the beginning of the Supreme Court clerkship, namely, law school, judge of
prior-clerkship, and clerk gender. Table A6 reports the results of regressions estimating
the relationship between clerk ideology before clerking and after clerking.
Eighth, Section A2.8 provides alternative results when accounting for clerks
for retired justices. Table A8 reports the main results when assigning clerks for retired
justices’ to the active justices the clerks worked for.
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A2.1 Missing Ideology Data
Figure A1: Number of Clerks Unobserved by Justice-Term
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Table A1: Number of Law Clerks Matched to Donations Divided by Total Law Clerks by Justice-Term
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1960 1/2 1/2 2/2 1/1 2/2 0/1 2/2
1961 1/1 2/2 1/2 1/1 2/2 0/1 1/3 1/2
1962 1/2 1/2 2/2 1/1 2/2 0/1 2/3 1/1
1963 1/1 1/2 2/2 1/1 2/2 2/2 2/3 1/2
1964 1/1 0/2 1/1 1/1 2/3 1/1 3/3 1/1
1965 2/2 2/2 2/2 1/1 1/2 2/2 2/3 1/1
1966 1/2 2/2 1/2 1/1 2/2 1/2 0/3 2/2
1967 1/2 2/2 1/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 1/3 2/2
1968 1/1 2/2 0/1 2/2 0/2 2/2 3/3 2/2
1969 1/2 1/2 4/7 1/1 2/3 2/2 2/2 1/2
1970 3/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/2 2/3 3/3 3/3 2/3
1971 2/2 3/3 2/5 1/3 2/3 2/3 3/3
1972 3/3 2/3 3/4 2/3 3/3 2/3 3/3 2/3 3/3
1973 1/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 3/3 3/3 1/3 3/3 3/3
1974 2/3 2/3 2/3 3/3 1/3 3/4 2/3 2/3 1/3
1975 2/3 3/3 3/3 2/2 3/3 2/4 1/3 1/1 3/3 2/2
1976 2/3 3/4 3/3 4/4 1/4 2/3 2/5 3/4 2/2
1977 3/4 4/4 3/4 3/4 4/4 2/3 3/3 2/4 3/4
1978 4/4 2/4 2/4 2/4 1/4 3/3 2/2 2/3 3/4
1979 2/4 4/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 3/3 2/2 3/3 3/4
1980 2/4 3/4 4/4 2/4 3/4 3/3 2/2 3/3 3/4
1981 3/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 3/4 4/4 3/3 1/2 3/3
1982 3/4 2/3 2/4 4/4 2/4 4/4 2/3 2/2 2/3
1983 1/4 3/4 4/4 3/4 4/4 3/4 2/3 2/2 3/4
1984 3/4 4/4 4/4 3/4 4/4 1/4 3/3 2/2 2/3
1985 3/4 3/4 4/4 3/4 4/4 2/4 1/3 2/2 3/3
1986 3/4 4/4 3/4 4/4 1/4 1/3 1/4 2/2 2/3
1987 3/4 4/4 3/4 4/4 4/4 1/3 4/4 3/3 3/4
1988 3/4 3/4 5/5 4/4 2/4 3/3 2/4 2/2 1/3
1989 3/4 2/4 4/4 2/4 4/4 2/3 2/4 1/2 4/4
1990 2/4 4/4 1/4 1/4 2/3 4/4 3/4 2/3 2/3
1991 4/4 3/4 2/4 2/3 3/4 2/3 2/3 5/5 2/3
1992 4/4 3/4 3/4 2/3 3/4 2/4 2/3 2/4 2/4
1993 3/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 1/3 4/4 4/4 2/4 4/4
1994 4/4 4/4 1/4 3/4 1/3 3/4 4/4 2/3 2/4
1995 3/4 2/5 3/4 3/4 2/4 3/5 4/4 2/3 3/5
1996 4/4 4/4 2/5 2/4 2/3 4/4 4/4 3/3 4/4
1997 3/4 4/4 3/4 3/5 3/4 2/4 4/4 3/3 3/4
1998 2/4 2/4 2/5 3/4 0/3 2/5 4/5 3/4 4/4
1999 3/4 3/5 3/4 2/4 2/3 3/4 2/4 3/3 4/4
2000 4/4 3/4 4/4 3/4 2/3 2/4 3/5 3/3 3/5
2001 3/4 3/4 4/4 3/4 1/3 2/4 3/4 3/3 4/4
2002 2/4 3/4 4/4 3/4 3/3 4/4 4/4 2/4 2/4
2003 3/4 4/4 3/4 3/4 2/3 2/4 4/4 2/4 3/4
2004 3/4 3/4 2/4 3/4 3/3 3/4 3/5 2/4 3/4
2005 1/2 1/4 3/4 2/4 3/4 1/3 5/7 1/4 4/4 3/3
2006 4/4 3/4 4/4 2/4 2/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4
2007 1/4 1/4 3/4 4/4 2/4 3/4 3/4 1/4 3/4
2008 3/4 2/4 3/4 2/4 3/4 1/4 3/4 0/4 3/4
2009 1/4 2/4 2/4 3/4 3/4 4/4 2/4 3/4
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A2.2 Justice Voting
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics of Justice Voting and Clerks
Justice Voting Clerks
Votes Conservative Number Proportion Mean
Justice Terms Cast Votes (%) Hired Observed (%) Ideology
Alito, Samuel 4 425 60.9 18 55.0 0.83
Black, Hugo L 10 1970 30.6 19 77.3 -0.30
Blackmun, Harry A 23 4278 46.2 88 71.9 -0.81
Brennan, William J 29 5389 27.4 91 79.6 -0.78
Breyer, Stephen 15 1539 42.5 64 67.2 -1.16
Burger, Warren E 16 3225 62.9 67 76.3 -0.29
Clark, Tom C 6 1201 40.4 13 85.7 -0.46
Douglas, William O 15 2578 18.5 26 87.8 -0.72
Ginsburg, Ruth Bader 16 1667 39.8 70 77.9 -1.09
Harlan, John M 10 1970 54.0 25 86.4 -0.74
Kennedy, Anthony 22 2552 57.3 95 74.1 0.15
Marshall, Thurgood 23 4304 25.4 82 79.3 -0.89
O’Connor, Sandra Day 24 3305 59.3 101 74.4 -0.63
Powell, Lewis F 14 2874 55.3 58 66.1 -0.55
Rehnquist, William 32 4892 67.9 98 67.4 0.11
Roberts, John 4 452 60.6 19 56.7 0.11
Scalia, Antonin 23 2759 64.9 101 68.6 0.27
Souter, David 18 1981 42.1 78 76.8 -1.09
Stevens, John Paul 34 4762 37.8 100 79.4 -0.96
Stewart, Potter 17 3409 47.3 48 85.6 -0.67
Thomas, Clarence 18 1938 67.6 78 78.7 0.79
Warren, Earl 8 1452 23.8 23 70.8 -0.41
White, Byron R 31 5728 48.6 90 78.4 -0.59
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A2.3 Clerk CFscores
Figure A2: Distribution of Clerk CFscores By Justice
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Figure A3: Scatterplot of Underlying Clerk Ideology by Justice Over Time
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Figure A4: Relationship Between Justice-Term Level Mean Clerk CFscore and Percent
Conservative Votes
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A2.4 Alternative Ideology Statistics
Table A3: Influence of Clerk Ideology on Justice Votes Using Alternative Statistics
Conservative Vote ∆ Conservative Votes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Median Justice-Year Clerk CFscore
Clerk Ideology 0.014∗∗ 0.010
(0.006) (0.009)
∆ Clerk Ideology 0.007 0.008∗
(0.004) (0.004)
R2 0.129 0.134 0.509 0.513
B. Minimum Justice-Year Clerk CFscore
Clerk Ideology 0.014∗∗∗ 0.013
(0.005) (0.008)
∆ Clerk Ideology 0.012∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
R2 0.129 0.134 0.520 0.526
C. Maximum Justice-Year Clerk CFscore
Clerk Ideology 0.011∗∗ 0.005
(0.005) (0.004)
∆ Clerk Ideology 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.129 0.134 0.503 0.508
Covariates
Term FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Justice FE Yes Yes No Yes
Justice Time Trends No Yes No No
N 66,209 66,209 404 404
Mean Conservative Votes 0.458 0.458 0.468 0.468
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Columns (1) and (2):
standard errors clustered by justice and case. Specifications include issue area fixed effects.
Columns (3) and (4): standard errors clustered by justice. Panels A, B, and C respectively
report results using the median, minimum, and maximum clerk ideology for the justice-term.
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A2.5 Conservative Votes by Subgroups
Table A4: Mean Conservative Vote Share and Proportion of Cases by Subgroups
Conservative Proportion
Vote Share (%) of Cases (%)
All Cases 46.8 100.0
A. Case Attributes Subgroups
NYT Cases 42.0 14.8
Not NYT Cases 47.4 85.2
CQ Cases 40.1 6.5
Not CQ Cases 47.3 93.5
Unanimous Cases 43.4 40.1
Not Unanimous Cases 48.9 59.9
Close Cases 48.0 29.7
Not Close Cases 46.1 70.3
B. Issue Areas Subgroups
Civil Rights 43.8 18.3
Criminal Procedure 50.2 22.5
Economic Activity 41.9 18.3
First Amendment 41.3 8.3
Judicial Power 60.2 13.6
Other 38.5 18.9
C. Justice Attributes Subgroups
Clerks Draft Opinion 48.2 93.1
Clerks Not Draft Opinion 24.0 6.9
Cons. Ideology above Median 57.5 57.2
Cons. Ideology below Median 32.5 42.8
Note: Each row reports the conservative vote share for subgroups of data indicated in the
first column, as well as the proportion of total cases for the subgroup. Panel A reports
statistics for: (i) high profile case, proxied by whether a case is high profile by whether it
appears on the front page of the New York Times (NYT) (Epstein and Segal, 2000), (ii)
legally significant cases, proxied by whether a case is classified as “major” by Congressional
Quarterly (CQ), (iii) unanimous and non-unanimous cases, and (iv) “close” cases, defined
as cases where the outcome is decided by a vote of 5-4 or 6-3. Panel B reports statistics by
issue area of cases. Panel C reports statistics: (i) by whether the justice has clerks write a
first draft of opinions, and (ii) liberal justices, based on whether the justice’s conservative
vote share is above or below the sample median.
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A2.6 Survey of Former Clerks
To verify that clerks are typically hired early in the prior term, we conducted
a survey of former Supreme Court clerks. To do so, we randomly selected 10% of our
sample of clerks. We then searched for the email addresses of the former clerks in this
sample using the information in our dataset (e.g., their name, law school attended,
justice they clerked for). Through this process, we identified the email addresses of 102
former clerks.
We then sent each of those clerks the email on the next page. In total, 66
former clerks responded to us. Of those, 4 respondents reported having no memory of
when they were hired. The other 62 respondents provided information on when they
were hired. Although some respondents provided a month they believed they were
hired, roughly half of respondents provided a range of time. For example, respondents
provided answers like: “in the fall of 1984”; “late 1999 or early 2000”; or “during the
third year of law school, 1993-94”.
Given the form of the responses, we took a conservative approach and es-
tablished the earliest quarter the clerk reported to have been hired. For example, for
most clerks who reported starting in July, we recored clerks hired in April to June of
the year they started as one quarter prior to the start date; January to March as two
quarters prior to the start date; October to December as three quarters prior to the
start date; and any time earlier as four or more quarters prior to the start date. The
distribution of responses are reported below in Figure A5.
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Text of Email Used for Our Survey
Dear [Insert First Name],
I am [Redacted for Review], and I am currently conducting research on the
Supreme Court. As part of that research, I am trying to understand when Supreme
Court clerks were hired for their clerkship. It is my understanding that you are a
former Supreme Court clerk. I was hoping you would be willing to answer two short
questions for me:
1. What is the month and year that you were offered your Supreme Court
clerkship?
2. What is the month and year that you started your Supreme Court clerk-
ship?
If you do not remember, any information would be helpful (as well as simply
knowing that you do not remember). Your answers will be kept confidential. I am
simply trying to document the average amount of time Supreme Court clerks are hired
before they started, and will not in any way reveal personalized information.
Thank you for your time and help,
[Redacted for Review]
This research has been approved by the [University Redacted] Institutional Re-
view Board. If you have any questions about participating in this research, you can
contact the [Relevant Institutional Review Board] at [Contact Information Redacted].
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Figure A5: Time Between the Hiring and Start Dates for Supreme Court Law Clerks
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A2.7 Stability of Clerk Ideology Over Time
Table A5: Influence of Clerk Ideology on Justice Voting after Restricting Donations to
those that Occurred Within Five Years after (or Before) the Clerkship
Conservative Vote ∆ Conservative Votes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Clerk CFscore 0.015∗∗ 0.011∗
(0.007) (0.005)
∆ Mean Clerk CFscore 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Covariates
Term FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Justice FE Yes Yes No Yes
Justice Time Trends No Yes No No
Obs 26,243 26,243 204 204
R-squared 0.112 0.114 0.564 0.564
Dep Var Mean 0.507 0.507 0.474 0.474
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Columns (1) and
(2): standard errors clustered by justice and case. Specifications include issue area fixed
effects. Columns (3) and (4): standard errors clustered by justice.
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Table A6: Clerk Ideology Before and After Clerking
Clerk Ideology
After Clerkship
(1) (2)
Clerk Ideology 0.970∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗
Before Clerkship (0.039) (0.041)
Judge Ideology 0.016
(0.042)
Obs 158 158
R-squared 0.799 0.799
Dep Var Mean -0.662 -0.662
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗
p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Sample includes clerks from
all levels of Federal courts.
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Table A7: Influence of Clerk Ideology on Justice Voting using Predicted Clerk Ideology
as an Instrument for Clerk Ideology
∆ Mean Clerk Ideology Conservative Vote
First Stage IV Regression
(1) (2)
∆ Mean Predicted Clerk Ideology 0.373∗∗
(0.166)
∆ Mean Clerk Ideology 0.012
(0.027)
N 404 404
R-squared 0.142 0.534
Dep. Var. Mean -0.014 0.468
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Standard errors
clustered by justice. Results from a two stage least squares regression, where clerk ideology
is instrumented for using a predicted value of clerk ideology based on the clerk’s law school,
previous judge, and gender.
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A2.8 Accounting for the Retired Justices’ Clerks
Table A8: Influence of Clerk Ideology on Justice Voting with Retired Clerk Reassign-
ment
Conservative Vote ∆ Conservative Votes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Clerk CFscore 0.017∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.004)
∆ Mean Clerk CFscore 0.009∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.005) (0.004)
Covariates
Term FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Justice FE Yes Yes No Yes
Justice Time Trends No Yes No No
N 66,209 66,209 404 404
R2 0.129 0.134 0.500 0.535
Mean Conservative Votes 0.458 0.458 0.468 0.468
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Columns (1) and
(2): standard errors clustered by justice and case. Specifications include issue area fixed
effects. Columns (3) and (4): standard errors clustered by justice.
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